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Phishing is one of the most potentially disruptive actions that can be performed on the 
Internet. Intellectual property and other pertinent business information could potentially 
be at risk if a user falls for a phishing attack. The most common way of carrying out a 
phishing attack is through email. The adversary sends an email with a link to a fraudulent 
site to lure consumers into divulging their confidential information. While such attacks 
may be easily identifiable for those well-versed in technology, it may be difficult for the 
typical Internet user to spot a fraudulent email.  
 
The emphasis of this research is to detect phishing attempts within emails. To date, 
various phishing detection algorithms, mostly based on the blacklists, have been reported 
to produce promising results. Yet, the phishing crime rates are not likely to decline as the 
cyber-criminals devise new tricks to avoid those phishing filters. Since the early non-text 
based approaches do not address the text content of the email that actually deludes users, 
this paper proposes a text-based phishing detection algorithm. In particular, this research 
focuses on improving upon the previously published text-based approach. The algorithm 
in the previous work analyzes the body text in an email to detect whether the email 
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message asks the user to do some action such as clicking on the link that directs the user 
to a fraudulent website. This work expanded the text analysis portion of that algorithm, 
which performed poorly in catching phishing emails. The modified algorithm generated 
considerably higher results in filtering out malicious emails than the original algorithm 
did; but the rate of text incorrectly identified as phishing, which is the FPR, was slightly 
worse. To address the FP problem, a statistical approach was adopted and the method 
ameliorated the FPR while minimizing the decrease in the phishing detection accuracy. 
 
The studies in this research make use of a simulation model technique to illustrate the 
algorithms. The simulation model visualizes the overall process of the analysis and yields 
graphical and statistical results that are used to conduct the experiments. In addition, 
since the simulation model operates in the environment controlled by a user, using the 
simulation model allows the user to easily apply modified concepts for experiments. This 
simulation feature was utilized to find and eliminate the unnecessary factors in the 
algorithm, and therefore the optimal performance time was measured. 
 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Phishing is a malicious use of Internet resources carried out to trick Internet users 
to reveal personal information, such as usernames, credit card information, and Social 
Security numbers to the attacker. Phishing can appear through a variety of 
communication forms such as instant messaging, SMS, VOIP, online messenger, and 
above all the most common form of phishing attack leverages email. Fraudsters send an 
email to an unsuspecting user that contains a link to a domain that is seemingly legitimate 
in the hopes that the users will input their private information for the attacker to steal 
(DigiCert, 2009). 
 
 There is no doubt phishing can be extremely damaging all organizations since 
tricking a user within a business network through a phishing scam is an easy way to 
obtain the user’s information in order to gain access to that business network. According 
to the RSA 2012 annual fraud report, the total number of phishing attacks in 2012 was 59% 
higher than 2011 (RSA, 2012). Global losses from phishing were estimated at $1.5 billion 
in 2012. That amount of damage is a 22% increase from 2011. The report estimated 
losses from phishing in 2013 would exceed $2 billion. The following graph in the figure 




Figure 1.1 Phishing Attacks per Year  
(source: adapted from APWG, 2013) 
 
 Phishing can also have a large impact on individual Internet users. According to 
the APWG report, among the top-level domains (TLDs) the .COM namespace contained 
the most unique domain names used for phishing as well as having the highest number of 
attacks within the namespace in the quarter of year 2013 (APWG, 2013). This would 
suggest that a large number of phishing attacks targeted typical Internet users and not 
corporations. This conclusion is particularly harmful, as typical Internet users have many 
user accounts on various websites that could be exploited, including accounts for banking, 
social media, and email. Imperva, a data security company, suggests that users use 
different passwords for each Internet website that they frequent in order to prevent 
multiple sets of credentials from being compromised in an attack (Imperva, 2010). 
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Typical Internet users may not follow such suggestions for proper password management, 
increasing the potential compromised accounts if a phishing scheme is successful. 
 
 To figure out the reasons why people fall for phishing attacks, Dhamija et al 
conducted the study designed to see people to identify a variety of websites as legitimate 
or fake (Dhamija et al, 2006). The participants consisted of 22 university students and 
staffs, and the results found that only two participants correctly classified phishing 
websites as the forged sites. Most of the participants simply believed the copied 
webpages themselves. Five participants only considered the contents of the webpages to 
judge its authenticity, without considering any other aspects of the browser such as the 
URL. About 50-75% of phishing domain names tend to have the name of the brand they 
are targeting within the URL used (McGrath & Gupta, 2008). The study by Dhamija et al. 
also stated that most careful and knowledgeable users could even fall for the attacks using 
very simple techniques, such as copying images of browser chrome or the SSL indicators 
in the address bar or status bar (Dhamija et al, 2006). Due to the ubiquity of the Internet, 
users on the Internet have a wide range of technical expertise (Hinde, 1998). This means 
that there are a large number of credulous Internet users with less technical understanding 
that could fall victim to such attacks. According to Sheng et al., the most vulnerable age 
group to phishing attacks is between ages 18 and 25, and this age group is susceptible due 
to the lack of education, the lack of experience on the Internet, less exposure to training 
resources, and insensitivity to risks (Sheng et al., 2010). In their study, they provided the 
participants with a good anti-phishing education to see the effects of such education. The 
training reduced 40% in the phishing susceptibility; however, the participants still fell for 
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the 28% of phishing messages and some training materials let the participants hesitate for 
clicking the actual legitimate links (Sheng et al., 2010). 
 
 The threat phishing poses to Internet users at large calls for action within the 
information security industry to create ways of detecting and preventing such attacks. 
Research into the area of phishing detection has yielded several types of email analysis to 
determine if an email should be classified as phishing. 
 
First, link or URL analysis refers to the using information about the links included 
within an email to detect the email used in a phishing attempt. This approach usually 
involves checking to see if the displayed link in the email matches the actual website 
URL that the user is taken to if the link is clicked, or examines the patterns in URLs in an 
email in order to compare to the features of phishing URLs. Garera et al. (2007) found 
the most frequent words in URLs in phishing emails, and their classifier checked if URLs 
had any of those tokens. Another early work by Ma et al. (2009) analyzed the host-based 
properties identified by the URL. For example, this algorithm checked the time-to-live 
(TTL) value for the DNS records associated with the hostname. The drawback of the 
methods based on URL analysis is the vulnerability to the phishing emails containing the 
URLs in new forms. Phishers started to use auto-generated system to produce a different 
URL each time. In addition, the URL analysis is based on heuristics, and the techniques 





The second well-known phishing detection approach is blacklisting, which is the 
most popular and widely-deployed techniques in industry. Blacklist is a set of well-
known phishing websites and addresses reported by trusted entities such as Google's and 
Microsoft's blacklist (Gaurav et al, 2012). PhishTank, a well-known website containing a 
blacklist, utilizes a wisdom-of crowds approach in order to collect phishing sites 
(PhishTank, 2013). People report potential phishing sites to the PhishTank website, and it 
is decided whether the submissions are indeed phishing scams by people’s vote (Hong, 
2012). PhishTank has received more than 7 million votes since October 2006. For 
blacklisting, both a client and a server side are necessary. The client component's 
implementation can be completed through an email or browser plug-in that communicate 
with a server component. The server component is a public website containing a list of 
phishing sites (Tout & Hafner, 2009). At first, the blacklisting technique seemed 
promising. However, it is a time-consuming and extremely demanding task to preserve a 
list of trustworthy sources, and this technique also has a potential threat to produce FP, 
which falsely classifies legitimate websites as phishing (Lalitha & Udutha, 2013). In 
addition, the blacklisting technique can be simply exposed to the threats by future 
unidentified cases, and is especially vulnerable to automatically generated URLs (Hong, 
2012). For instance, the tricky phishers started to adopt sophisticated techniques such as 
the phish toolkits to generate plenty of unique phishing URLs used by the notorious 
hacking group known as the Rock Phish Gang, and this toolkit hindered blacklisting 




Other previous works also took an approach based on either the blacklisting 
(Prakash et al., 2010, Zhang et at., 2008) or the analysis of URL features (Le et al., 2011). 
Popular web browsers such as Google, Firefox also deployed the blacklist-based 
technique to detect phishing scams (Schneider et al.,2007). The anti-phishing toolbars 
including Google Safe Browsing (Google, 2013), NetCraft (Netcraft, 2013), SpoofStick 
(CoreStreet, 2007), SiteAdvisor (McAfee, 2013) and EarthLink Toolbar (EarthLink, 2013) 
are blacklist-based alike. Although the methods above proved their merits generating a 
blacklist or listing the features of phish URLs, skillful criminals can elude these non-
robust (non-resisting) properties. 
 
1.2 Objective 
The research in this thesis aims to report on an experiment into text-based phishing 
detection using publicly available resources. There have been a number of approaches to 
block phishing attempts to lure people to malicious websites, and the reports affirmed 
that their algorithms were capable of filtering out the phishing scams in a highly 
successful phish detection rate. Despite those efforts, the phishing is still threatening us, 
and the seriousness becomes even worse. Since those previous algorithms did not 
emphasize on the contents of the text in an email, which actually deceived people, the 
text-based algorithms proposed in this paper examine text in an email to recognize 
phishing scams.  
 
The developed algorithms in this thesis use previously published work on the, so-
called PhishNet-NLP, a content based phishing detection system, as a starting point. In 
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particular, this research focuses on the text analysis portion of PhishNet-NLP that uses 
natural language techniques. The original text analysis produced relatively poor results in 
both TPR and FPR compared to the other analyses of PhishNet-NLP. Thus, the main 
purpose of this research is to expand the text analysis portion and improve the 
performance so as to fill in the gap left by the other techniques. Another objective of this 
study is to optimize the performance of the modified algorithms in terms of the phishing 
detection accuracy and processing time. 
 
To build the model of the proposed algorithms, the studies make use of the 
AnyLogic simulation modeling tool described in the section 2.3. The AnyLogic 
simulation model animates the specific analytic processing and produces graphical results 
after the completion of analysis. Using the simulation model allows to easily control the 
parameters, and therefore the different performance times and phishing detection rates 
can be measured by changing the concepts for the algorithm. Finally, the most effective 
environment for both the processing time and the performance on catching phishing 
emails can be found. 
 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
Chapter 1: Introduction — provides background information in phishing scams and 
PhishNet-NLP to introduce the motivation for doing further research on PhishNet-NLP. 




Chapter 2: Literature Review — describes the definitions of the phishing, the types of 
phishing attacks, the simulation modeling and the AnyLogic simulation software tool. 
This chapter also explains three different content-based phishing detection algorithms 
proposed in the past including PhishNet-NLP.  
 
Chapter 3: Proposed Approach — specifically explains how the text score is generated in 
PhishNet-NLP and discusses the expanded algorithm. This chapter also states the 
assumptions, the implementation details, and the data set.  
 
Chapter 4: Simulation Results and Discussion — describes the simulation procedures and 
presents the results of the proposed approach. This chapter also introduces a methodology 
to reduce the FPR increased by the modified algorithm, and discusses the results of the 
methodology. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Work — proposes the conclusion of this research, and 







CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The origin of Phishing 
 Phishing is a criminal act which uses a combination of "social engineering and 
technical subterfuge" to steal user information (APWG, 2013). The idea of "phishing" 
first was presented in a 1987 conference called Interex (Robson, 2011). The origin of the 
word "phishing" comes from the analogy that malicious Internet users lure to "fish" for 
credential information from the sea of Internet user by using email (APWG, 2004). The 
Internet of "phishing" was first mentioned on the alt.2600 hacker newsgroup in January 
1996, or the term could have started to be used in the earlier printed edition of the hacker 
newsletter "2600". In the 1996, the term "phishing" started to be used to describe the 
incidents that hackers were exploiting passwords from unsuspecting America On-Line 
(AOL) user to steal AOL accounts. Nowadays, the term has been expanded to include 
various attacks to target personal information (Milletary & Center, 2005). 
 
The term is obviously derived from "fishing" and is always spelled with "ph" to 
differentiate it from the origin, and possibly to emulate phone "phreaking". Considering 
the definition of phishing, the derivative noun, "phisher," refers to the perpetrator of the 
crime. Hackers replaced "ph" with "f", and the original form of hacking is known as 
"phreaking". The word "phreaking" was first adopted by the first hacker, John Draper 
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who devised the infamous Blue Box by which he was able to hack telephone systems in 
the early 1970s (APWG, 2004). It is believed that this first hacking form known as 
"Phone Phreaking" is the origin of the "ph" spelling in hacker organizations. Stolen 
accounts by criminals were called "phish" by 1996, and phish started to be traded 
between hackers. The number of phishing attacks has been dramatically increasing, and 
criminals are expanding the area of their activity from simply stealing AOL accounts to 
targeting users of online banking and e-commerce sites (APWG, 2004). 
 
2.2 Types of Phishing Attacks 
Phishing attacks can be classified into several types by the way of attacks. This 
section introduces what kinds of phishing schemes have been developed. 
 
Spear phishing is targeted phishing using data gathered through outside means, 
such as user names. The specific targets can be companies and government agencies, and 
the criminals send spoofed email messages misrepresenting the phishers as people from 
the recipient’s company or organization, such as a human resources department (Bank, 
2005). Jagatic et al. (2007) conducted experiments with how to take advantage of the 
personal information from social networks, and the research showed that people tended to 
more fall for the phish when the email came from the person in their contacts. The 
fraudsters visit popular social network sites such as MySpace, Facebook, and LinkedIn to 




When spear phishing is used against the rich and powerful targets such as 
executives of corporations in order to gain the most corporate information, the type of 
attack is called "whaling" (Markoff, 2008). According to the report by Markoff, the chief 
executive of an antispam company received an email and fell for the phishing scam, and 
several other high level targets received the similar attack. From late 2010 to early 2011, 
victims of the successful spear phishing attacks include RSAsecurID, the Canadian 
government, the Austrailian Prime Minister and other ministers (Hong, 2011).  
 
Pharming is more dangerous technique in that pharmers make use of an email that 
simply damages the victim once the email is opened by the receiver. Since the pharming 
email contains stealth applications such as virus, Trojan horses that are automatically 
installed in the user’s computer, the user may not even notice his or her personal 
information stored in the computer in danger unless antivirus programs catch the 
malicious applications (Hicks, 2005). The installed applications have a role to redirect the 
browser to the counterfeit sites when the user visits the official website of an organization. 
The oblivious user provides the id and password to login the website without realizing the 
website is the fake webpage created by the criminal. As a result, the pharmer harvests the 
personal information that the victim divulges (Hicks, 2005). 
 
2.3 Simulation Modeling and AnyLogic 
 AnyLogic is a multi-methods simulation modeling tool developed by XJ 
Technologies. Modeling is one of the ways to solve real-world problems. In the majority 
of cases, we cannot afford to find the right solutions by experimenting with real objects 
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which is very expensive, or just impossible. The whole modeling thing can be defined as 
experiments in a risk-free world where it is allowed to make mistakes and control 
variables in the environment so as to find the most appropriate way to deal with the issue 
(Grigoryev & Borshchev, 2012). 
 
 As a way of modeling technology, simulation model is an executable model to 
analyze dynamic systems. Simulation model is based on a set of rules and the rules can 
take a variety of forms such as differential equations, state charts, process flowcharts, and 
schedules. As the simulation model runs, it shows its current process and model's output. 
Building a simulation model is conducted by the special software tools that use 
graphically and textually simulation specific languages (Grigoryev & Borshchev, 2012). 
 
 Simulation modeling has advantages. First, a simulation model's structure reflects 
the system's structure since simulation models utilize visual languages, and it helps 
communicate the model's internal to others. Second, measurements and statistical 
analysis can be added to a simulation model at any time. Third, the ability to play and 
animate the system behavior in time is a simulation's great merit. Animations are useful 
for demonstrations, verification and debugging. Lastly, a simulation is a great medium to 
convey proposals. The simulation's visualization will have an advantage over those who 
only use numbers (Grigoryev & Borshchev, 2012). 
 
 AnyLogic is one of the special software tools for simulation modeling. AnyLogic 
is based on Java programming language, and the native Java environment in AnyLogic 
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provides various features to interact with Java code, libraries, and data from outside. 
Since it is possible to use Java code at any place in the AnyLogic model, the 
programmers can adjust their models to meet their needs (Emrich, Suslov, & Judex, 
2007). AnyLogic also provides an extensible statistical distribution function set. 
AnyLogic has the numerical solver automatically at runtime in accordance with the 
activities of the model (Zauner, Leitner, & Breitenecker, 2007). This function set can be 
used to generate visual and statistical results along with animation functions. Furthermore, 
AnyLogic offers the interface of creating interactive animations, including elementary 
graphical shapes, various types of indicators and graphs. It also provides plentiful API for 
creating sophisticated animations (Karpov, Ivanovski, Voropai, & Popov, 2005). 
 
2.4 Previous Content based Phishing Detection Techniques 
2.4.1 Phish Mail Guard 
 Phish Mail Guard is a phishing mail detection system using textual and URL 
analysis and a phishing detection method which is a combination of blacklist, white list 
and heuristic (Hajgude & Ragha, 2012). The DNS analyzer component in the system 
determines whether the email is phishing or non-phishing by analyzing visual DNS and 
actual DNS in the email. If the DNS of the hyperlink is present in blacklist, email is 
considered as phishing. If it is present in white list, email is considered as non-phishing. 
Blacklist contains a list of known fake DNS and the white list holds a list of known valid 
DNS. The DNS analyzer module is implemented using those lists to select a technique 




 If the DNS of the hyperlink in the email does not fall into either of the blacklist or 
the white list, the heuristic detection process takes over the next step. The heuristic 
module has text and URL algorithms. For the text algorithm, the body text in an email is 
parsed into tokens and the tokens are compared to blacklisted token. If the numbers of 
matched tokens that are blacklisted token pass the threshold, the email is considered 
phishing. In the URL algorithm, link URL in body text is parsed into tokens and 
compared with blacklisted features from URL. For example, the numbers of @ symbol, 
the length of the hostname and the IP address in the URL are counted. By the same token, 
if the number of matched tokens is more than threshold, it is considered phishing. The 
overall process of the Phish Mail Guard is described in the figure 2.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The overall process of Phish Mail Guard 
(source: adapted from Hajgude & Ragha, 2012) 
 
In this research, the authors suggested the hybrid phishing detection algorithm, 
and expected that their new approach would be able to catch phishing emails significantly 
15 
 
better than the previous work. As for the potential problem of the Phish Mail Guard, the 
heuristic module in Phish Mail Guard can yield the high FPR since the textual and URL 
analysis within the heuristic process are technically based on the blacklists which have 
several issues described in the previous section 1.1. Although the researchers mentioned 
that FPR could be reduced by using the DNS, link, and textual contents analysis, it is 
believed that they did not verify their algorithm by experiment since any specific data and 
results of their proposed algorithm were not present in the paper. Therefore, the potential 




 CANTINA is a content based approach for detecting phishing web sites (Zhang, 
Hong, & Cranor, 2007). CANTINA used TF-IDF and the Robust Hyperlink algorithms. 
CANTINA adopted heuristics in order to reduce FPR. TF-IDF is often used in 
information retrieval and text mining (Salton & McGill, 1986). TF-IDF measures how 
important a word is to a document in a corpus. TF means the number of times a given 
term appears in a specific document. IDF represents a measure of the general importance 
of the term. In other words, it shows how common a term is across an entire collection of 
documents. If a term has a high TF-IDF weight, TF is high and DF is low. 
 
 The Robust Hyperlink algorithm was developed to address the problem of broken 
hyperlinks (Phelps & Wilensky, 2000). Lexical signatures are a small number of well 
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chosen terms to identify the given page. Lexical signatures are added to URLs and if the 
link does not work, then it feeds signatures to search engine.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 URL containing lexical signature 
 
 In CANTINA, TF-IDF was adopted to generate useful lexical signatures, and the 
researchers found that top five words as scored by TF-IDF were surprisingly effective. 
CANTINA is based on two assumptions that scammers often directly copy legitimate 
webpages or include keywords like name of legitimate organizations, and with Google, 
phishing webpages should have a low Google Page Rank considering few links pointing 
to the fake webpages. 
 
 In the CANTINA process, first, it calculates the TF-IDF score for each word in a 
given webpage. Second, it takes five words with highest TF-IDF weights. Third, it feeds 
those five keywords to the Google search engine. If the domain name of current webpage 
appears in the top N search results, the webpage is regarded as legitimate. The 
researchers defined N = 30 since the number 30 was proved to work well. As a means of 
reducing FPR, some heuristic methods were utilized in CANTINA. First method was to 
add the domain name to the lexical signature since the domain name itself usually can 
best identify the webpage. Second method was called ZMP. If Google returns zero search 
results, the website is considered as phishing. Even though ZMP had the potential 
problem to increase FPR, when combined with adding the domain name, it could actually 
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reduce FPR. For the last, CANTINA added several heuristics from SpoofGuard (Chou et 
al., 2004), and PILFER (Fette et al., 2007) well known phishing detection tools. The 
following table 2.1 lists the heuristics used in CANTINA. The similar or equal heuristics 
to the listed heuristics except for the Forms and TF-IDF-Final were used in the 
SpoofGuard and PILFER toolbars. 
 
Table 2.1 Heuristics used in CANTINA 
(source: adapted from Zhang, Hong, & Cranor, 2007) 
 
  
 When it comes to the limitations of CANTINA, first, querying Google each time 
has such a bad impact on system performance. Second, the attackers can put images 
instead of words in the forged webpage, and therefore the images can prevent the TF-IDF 
algorithm from producing word scores. It is also plausible for scammers to use 
indistinguishable color for text from the background color of the webpage. Once 
criminals find out that CANTINA uses Google's PageRank algorithm, they can take 
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advantage of already high page ranked webpages, or they can use the phishing URLs 
after their phishing websites become indexed enough by Google. 
 
2.4.3 PhishNet-NLP 
 PhishNet-NLP is a phishing detection algorithm based on email contents analysis 
using natural language techniques (Verma, Shashidhar, & Hossain, 2012). PhishNet-NLP 
is designed to distinguish between "actionable" and "informational" emails. The main 
idea of PhishNet-NLP is that phishing emails are designed to trigger an action from users. 
Therefore, the "actionable" email refers to the email leading users to do some actions in 
email texts. The "informational" email represents the legitimate emails. The algorithm 
consists of a combination of link analysis, header analysis, and text analysis, and it 
determines if the email poses a phishing threat by a total score that is a sum of results of 
three analyses. 
 
The link analysis examines whether the websites led by the URLs in the email are 
legitimate. If the body text in the email contains more than 10 distinct words, the system 
selects the top four words out of the 10 words based on the words’ TF-IDF scores. Then, 
the system feeds all domains from the URLs in the email to the Google search engine 
along with the top four words, and if any domain does not appear in the top 30 results by 
Google search, the email is regarded as phishing. The header analysis makes use of the 
header contents of an email to decide if the email is a phishing email or not. This analysis 
typically includes checking that the ‘FROM’, ‘DELIVERED-TO’, and ‘RECEIVED 
FROM’ fields of the email matches the actual sender and checking the IP address from 
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which the email was sent against phishing blacklists. The analyzing email text module is 
based on natural language techniques including parsing, POS tagging, named entity 
recognition, stemming, stopword removal and word sense disambiguation. 
 
 The text analysis portion takes into consideration “actionable verbs” that tempt 
the user into performing an action. The text scoring module checks if email contains any 
actionable verbs in body text and if any exists, then it scores the word called a keyword 
with a scoring formula set by the authors. For the context score, the similarity 
computation between the new email and the previous emails is performed. PhishNet-NLP 
applied TF-IDF and cosine measure for similarity computation. The text score represents 
whether email is innocuous or not itself and the context score represents whether email is 
innocuous or not after comparing with the other emails including both user's sent and 
received emails. The outcome of text analysis is the combination of the text score and the 
context score. If the text score of the email shows that the email is not a phishing, then 
the context score is calculated to determine if it is a legitimate email. Once those three 
components finish their analyses, the scores are combined to make a decision. The 




Figure 2.3 Flow chart of PhishNet-NLP 
(source: adapted from Verma, Shashidhar, & Hossain, 2012) 
 
 The algorithm produced promising results in their study. Header and link analysis 
in their study consistently performed with an accuracy rating of over 95% in detecting 
phishing emails in the experiments run. Text analysis lagged behind, performing between 
about 60% and 80% accuracy. When it comes to FPR, header and link analysis produced 
around 97% accuracy, but text analysis was only able to identify 79% (without the 
context) and 85% (with context) as legitimate. The text analysis seems the main 
component of this algorithm considering the implementation portion of the text analysis 
in this research, but it is questioned to include the text analysis in the whole system since 
the text analysis portion did not help the overall performance efficiency. It is believed 
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that the accuracy rating of the text analysis can be improved upon by expanding the text 
analysis algorithm. The remainder of this paper describes the efforts to the PhishNet-NLP 





CHAPTER 3. PROPOSED APPROACH 
3.1 The Text Score in PhishNet-NLP 
PhishNet-NLP used several techniques within the realm of text analysis to help 
determine whether or not an email should be classified as phishing. Two scores are 
generated by the PhishNet-NLP algorithm to help with this process, a text score and a 
context score. In particular, this section will closely scrutinize the process of the text 
score generation. In order to produce a text score, lexical analysis, POS tagging, named 
entity recognition, normalization of words to lower case, stemming, and stopword 
removal techniques are employed by the algorithm (Verma, Shashidhar, & Hossain, 
2012). 
 
 For the named entity analysis, the set of all permutations of the email receiver's 
first, last, and middle names and their spelling variants when taken two to N times where 
N denoted the total number of names was calculated. According to the authors, an email 
is likely to be a phishing attempt if an institution is mentioned within the email. Therefore, 
an email was given a score of 1 to denote phishing if the number of named entities within 
the email excluding those in the set of permutations was greater or equal to one.
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 The analysis of actionable verbs utilizes WordNet to retrieve the synsets for each 
of the initial actionable verbs. WordNet is known as an on-line lexical reference system. 
WordNet can be also defined as a combination of thesaurus and dictionaries (Fellbaum, 
2010). WordNet groups English nouns, verbs, and modifiers into synonym sets (synsets), 
which are collections of similar words in terms of meanings (Miller et al.,1990). 
 
The following formula shown in (1) was derived to calculate the text score of 
actionable verbs found within each sentence in the email in question. 
 
Text score (v) = {1 + x(l + a)} / 2L   (1) 
 
Within this equation, v is the actionable verb, x equals 1 if the sentence contains a 
word in SA (synset of adverbs) or a direction word. In case that the sentence has a link or 
the word “url,” “link,” or “links”, x is also 1. Otherwise x equals 0. The parameter l is the 
number of links contained in the email, and the maximum value of l is 2. The parameter a 
equals 1 if there is a word conveying a sense of urgency or mention of money in the 
sentence. The parameter L is the level of the actionable verb within the synset reached by 
following the troponymy links from the synset of the initial actionable verbs. For instance, 
if the actionable verb belongs to the set of synset following up to 1 troponymy links from 
the synset of the initial actionable verbs, the L value is 2. SA, the set of direction words, 
the set of urgency words and the actionable verbs are shown in the Appendix A. The text 




3.2 The Expansion of the Scope of POS for Actionable Verbs 
The expansion in this study focused on the text score analysis. The modified 
algorithm includes not only actionable verbs, but also other POS so that it can catch any 
other actionable words in phishing emails, not just verbs. It is based on an intuition that a 
command “Update your ……” can be as easily made with “your account information 
needs to be updated” or “An update of your account” where, in this case, update is the 
action in question. The word update above appeared with different POS forms: verb, past 
participle and noun. By the same token, other actionable verbs such as click, go, and 
move can be present in the body text in an email with a variety of POS forms. The 
sentence where one of the actionable verbs exists in a different POS form still needs to be 
examined by the text score analysis since the different POS forms do not change the level 
of threat that the sentence potentially has. To prevent actionable words, not only verbs, 
from not being caught, this proposed algorithm expanded the POS for the actionable 
verbs into all POS. 
 
3.3 Assumptions 
 The initial actionable verbs for use within these experiments were selected based 
on the sample keywords supplied by the authors of PhishNet-NLP within their paper. The 
authors did not explicitly state what keywords to use within PhishNet-NLP, and therefore 
the sample keywords given in the paper were used. The list of actionable verbs can be 




 The stopwords within these experiments are the default English stopwords list 
found at the following location: http://www.ranks.nl/resources/stopwords.html. This 
word list was used for the stopwords in this research because information on the 
stopwords used in the original PhishNet-NLP experiments was not provided. The list of 
default English stopwords includes the following: Jr., Sr., Dr., Prof., Mr., Mrs., Ms., 
Miss., a, about, after, again, against, all, am, an, and, any, are, aren't, as, at, be, because, 
been, being, both, if. This is not an exhaustive list of stopwords. The full list of stopwords 
can be found in Appendix B. 
 
 Synonyms and troponyms of actionable words were chosen for the experiments 
by the first sense of actionable words. For the purpose of finding the first sense of words, 
WordNet was employed. Within the original PhishNet-NLP experiments, SenseLearner 
(Mihalcea & Csomai, 2005) and TextRank (Mihalcea & Tarau, 2004) were used for word 
sense disambiguation. These tools were unable to be implemented in this experiment 
design due to difference in programming languages used. WordNet orders senses by the 
estimated usage frequency of each sense of a word (Du et al., 2008). The most frequently 
used sense of each word was therefore used to find synonyms and troponyms in this 
analysis. 
 
 No context score was covered in these experiments, unlike the original PhishNet-
NLP. This is due to a lack of clarity in how the context score evaluation took place within 




Lastly, in the original PhishNet-NLP, the named entity recognition technique was 
used to check that a phishing email has a recipient’s name. However, since the email 
recipients’ names in corpus were not provided, these experiments did not make use of the 
named entity recognition technique. 
 
3.4 Implementation details and Data sets 
 For the implementation, Java programming language was used with the Eclipse 
Kepler version as the development environment. The chosen stemming algorithm, which 
is essential to extract the stem of the word, was the Porter stemmer in this research 
(Porter, 1980). The Stanford POS tagger version 3.1.4 wsj-0-18-left3words was used for 
POS tagging. The Stanford Tokenizer was used to divide text into a sequence of tokens. 
WordNet was used to generate the synsets of the words used in analysis. WordNet 2.1 
version was adopted to match as closely as possible the setup of the original PhishNet-
NLP experiments. When it comes to a simulation tool, AnyLogic 6.9.0 version university 
education was used (XJ Technologies, 2013). The implementation was completed on the 
Eclipse platform since the Eclipse supports better environment for Java in terms of 
coding and debugging than AnyLogic does. Once the implementation on the Eclipse 
platform was finished, it was ported to the AnyLogic model. 
 
 Two corpora were applied to the experiments for testing the modified algorithm. 
The first corpus was the phishing corpus used in the original PhishNet-NLP experiments. 
The total number of emails contained in this corpus is 4558, all of which are classified as 
phishing emails (Nazario, 2004). The other corpus used for the experiments was the 
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Enron email corpus (CALO Project, 2009). The chosen collection from the Enron corpus 
for this implementation contains 7944 emails, all of which are classified as legitimate 






CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 The Simulation Procedure 
The AnyLogic simulation model starts with the setting screen as seen in the figure 
4.1. The setting has two input boxes for the phishing and the legitimate corpora. Since the 
data for this study is limited to only two corpora, the default names of the input data are 
PhishNET for the phishing corpus and Enron for the legitimate corpus. If any other 
corpus is available in the future, the name of the corpus can be entered in the corpus input 
box for processing. The radio button “The range of SV” is used to define the scope of the 
synsets of the actionable words to be used in the experiment. The purpose of this option 
is to measure the processing time and the phishing detection accuracy depending on the 
selected range of the actionable words. Under the corpus input boxes and the range of SV 
radio button, two check boxes exist. One of them is K-fold Cross-Validation. The k-fold 
cross-validation technique is used to find some ineffective actionable words. The detail of 
the k-fold cross-validation is described in section 4.3.1. For the k-fold cross-validation 
test, it is required to choose the validation set and the training set. In this simulation, the 
data set is divided into four groups, and only one group must be the validation set and the 
rest of the groups are supposed to be the training set. The k-fold cross-validation test is 
able to find unnecessary actionable words called bad keywords. 
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The other check box, Exclude bad keywords, is used to run the simulation without 
bad keywords. The user can input up to ten bad keywords. 
 
Figure 4.1 The setting screen of the AnyLogic model. 
 
 Once the settings are finalized, clicking the Procedure Animation displayed on the 
upper right directs to the procedure animation screen seen in the figures 4.2 and 4.3. The 
simulation runs when the start button is pushed. On the upper side of the screen, the name 
of email being examined is displayed. The simulation visualizes the process of the text 
score generation, and thereby the decision is made whether the email is phishing or 
legitimate. Both the original PhishNet-NLP algorithm and the modified algorithm 
analyze the emails at the same time to compare both results. In the Finding a keyword 
part, the found actionable word in the email is shown. The words shown in these two 
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boxes are the stems of the words. The Calculation Processing part describes the specific 
elements for the text score. Lastly, in the Decision part, both conclusions by two 
algorithms are displayed with each of the maximum text score.  
 
Figure 4.2 The procedure animation screen in the AnyLogic (1) 
 
 




Clicking the Results displayed in the upper right corner of the screen moves to the 
results screen described in the figure 4.4 below. The total number of tested emails, the 
number of emails containing no body texts, and the number of exceptions are presented. 
The results of the phishing and legitimate corpus are separately produced by the original 
PhishNet-NLP algorithm described as PhishNet and the modified algorithm described as 
Expanding PhishNet in the results screen. 
 
Figure 4.4 The results screen of the AnyLogic model. 
 
Besides those results, the frequency of actionable words, POS, synsets of the 
actionable words by troponymy levels is stored in an excel file. The AnyLogic supports 
the function to store the data into an excel file or retrieve the data from an excel file. The 
result of the k-fold cross-validation is saved in a text file. 
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4.2 The Expansion of the Scope of POS for Actionable Verbs 
4.2.1 Initial Results 
4.2.1.1 The TPR in the Phishing Corpus 
 Testing on the phishing corpus yielded similar results for the original PhishNet-
NLP algorithm with context score removed that was achieved in the original experiments.  
The figure 4.5 shows the results obtained in the original PhishNet-NLP. In the result of 




Figure 4.5 The Results of Original PhishNet-NLP  
(source: adapted from Verma, Shashidhar, & Hossain, 2012) 
 
The original PhishNet-NLP algorithm in this simulation was able to correctly 
identify 68.2% of phishing emails within the phishing corpus. The modified algorithm 
showed about a 19% increase in identification over the PhishNet-NLP algorithm, 
identifying 87% of phishing emails within the phishing corpus. These results are seen in 
the figure 4.6 below. 
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            (a) PhishNet-NLP                            (b) Expanding PhishNet-NLP 
Figure 4.6 The initial TPR in the phishing corpus 
 
4.2.1.2 The FPR in the Legitimate Corpus 
 Testing on the Enron corpus yielded slightly better results for the original 
PhishNet-NLP algorithm over this extended algorithm. The original algorithm was able 
to correctly label 92.6% of the emails in the Enron corpus as legitimate, and the expanded 
algorithm obtained 87.5%. The new algorithm had about a 5% increase in FPR. The 
results are described in the figure 4.7 below. 
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         (a) PhishNet-NLP                            (b) Expanding PhishNet-NLP 
Figure 4.7 The initial FPR in the legitimate corpus 
 
4.2.2 Adjusted Results 
As the experiments were run, some problems were founded both in the 
implementation and the phishing corpus. First, a third party text tokenizer did not work 
properly. Initially, LingPipe version 4.1.0 was adopted as the text tokenizer. LingPipe is a 
well-known tool kit to process text based on computational linguistics (Baldwin & 
Carpenter, 2003). The role of this tokenizer was to parse the body text in an email into 
the sentences. However, LingPipe was not able to identify multiple spaces after a 






Table 4.1 The examples of the defect in tokenizing text by LingPipe 
Example 1 – correctly split text into sentences 
Original text 
PayPal is constantly working to ensure security by regularly screening the 
accounts in our system. (Single space) We recently reviewed your 
account, and we need more information to help us provide you with secure 
service. 
Parsed sentences by 
LingPipe 
Sentence 1)  
PayPal is constantly working to ensure security by regularly screening the 
accounts in our system. 
Sentence 2)  
We recently reviewed your account, and we need more information to help 
us provide you with secure service. 
Example 2 – incorrectly split text into sentences 
Original text 
Please click here and complete the Steps to Remove Limitations. 
(Multiple spaces) Completing all of the checklist items will automatically 
restore your account access. 
Parsed sentences by 
LingPipe 
Sentence 1)  
Please click here and complete the Steps to Remove Limitations.                      
Completing all of the checklist items will automatically restore your 
account access. 
  
In the example 1, if there is a single space after a sentence followed by a period, 
LingPipe can split the text into two separate sentences. However, if there are more than 
two spaces after a period, this tokenizer misrecognizes the text as a single sentence that 
the text actually consists of two separate sentences as seen in the example 2. This 
problem affected the results. The falsely tokenzied sentence such as the example 2 could 
have the text score that was calculated from more than two sentences respectively 
containing an actionable word, and therefore it results in the high TPR and FPR. To 
address this issue, the Stanford Tokenizer was adopted, and this tokenizer was able to 
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correctly split the sentences regardless of the number of spaces between sentences 
(Manning et al., 2013). 
 
 Second, the hyperlinks in emails confused splitting sentences. Most hyperlinks 
have delimiters such as a question mark, semicolon and colon. Since the sentence 
tokenizer could not distinguish between the delimiters in the sentences and the delimiters 
in the hyperlinks, the tokenizer parsed a hyperlink containing the delimiters into the 
separate hyperlinks. 
 
Table 4.2 The example of the falsely tokenized sentences by hyperlink 
Original text 
However, if you did not initiate the log ins, please visit PayPal as soon as 
possible to verify your identity : https:\/\/www.paypal.com\/us\/cgi-
bin\/webscr ? cmd = _ login-run Verify your identity is a security 
measure that will ensure that you are the only person with access to the 
account . 
Parsed sentences  
Sentence 1)  
However, if you did not initiate the log ins, please visit PayPal as soon as 
possible to verify your identity : https:\/\/www.paypal.com\/us\/cgi-
bin\/webscr ? 
Sentence 2)  
cmd = _ login-run Verify your identity is a security measure that will 
ensure that you are the only person with access to the account . 
 
As seen in the example in the table 4.2 above, the tokenizer split the sentence by 
the question mark in the hyperlink. In addition, the second sentence, “Verity…”, was 
regarded as the same sentence with the first sentence due to the lack of an end delimiter 
after the hyperlink. Whether a sentence has a hyperlink or not directly affects the x value 
in the text score equation. In that example, the x value by the hyperlink is counted twice 
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since the hyperlink is split into the two sentences. To fix this problem, a hyperlink was 
replaced with the unique word, ‘GIL_Symbol_of_Hyperlink’. If the first word after the 
hyperlink starts with a capital letter with which a new sentence begins, the unique word is 
followed by a period. 
 
Lastly, the phishing corpus contained some malformed emails. Each email is 
supposed to have its unique email id called message id, and this implementation counts 
emails by the messaged ids. In the phishing corpus, some redundant message ids 
appeared without any information. Since they were considered as emails without texts, it 
increased the TPR. To fix this falsely increased the TPR, the redundant message ids were 
removed. Some emails had unreadable character sets by the program such as iso-
18899997-1, iso-6078-6, iso-5367-8, iso-3290-7. These characters sets were converted 
into process able character sets. Emails grammatically malformed were fixed. The 
examples of errors are shown in the table 4.3 below. 
 
Table 4.3 The example of the errors found in the phishing corpus. 
Example 1 – incorrect character set 
Before Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_NextPart_2rfkindysadvnqw3nerasdf";iso-8859-1 
After Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_NextPart_2rfkindysadvnqw3nerasdf";charset="iso-8859-1"; 
Table 4.3 Continued. 














4.2.2.1 The TPR in the Phishing Corpus 
Testing on the error fixed phishing corpus with the modified implementation 
yielded slightly lower the TPR results for both the PhishNet-NLP and the expanded 
algorithm than the previous initial TPR results. The PhishNet-NLP algorithm was able to 
correctly identify 65.6% of phishing emails within the phishing corpus. The expanded 
algorithm showed about an 18% increase in identification over the PhishNet-NLP 
algorithm, identifying 83.5% of phishing emails within the phishing corpus. The results 
are seen in the figure 4.8 below. 
       
         (a) PhishNet-NLP                       (b) Expanding PhishNet-NLP 
Figure 4.8 The adjusted TPR in the phishing corpus 
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4.2.2.2 The FPR in the Legitimate Corpus 
Testing on the Enron corpus with the modified implementation produced slightly 
higher FPR results for both the PhishNet-NLP and the expanded algorithm than the 
previous initial FPR results. The original algorithm was able to correctly label 91.2% of 
the emails in the Enron corpus as legitimate. The expanded algorithm was able to 
correctly label 85.1% of the emails as legitimate. The new algorithm had about a 6% 
increase in FPR for the legitimate corpus. The results are present in the figure 4.9 below. 
       
       (a) PhishNet-NLP                          (b) Expanding PhishNet-NLP 
Figure 4.9 The adjusted FPR in the legitimate corpus 
 
4.2.3 Inferences of the widened gap in the results 
The table 4.4 below describes the results from the PhishNet-NLP and the 
modified algorithm. The original TPR in the initial results was very close to the TPR of 
the PhishNet-NLP. In the adjusted results not only the gap in the TPR from the PhishNet-
NLP became widened, but also the overall phishing detection performance was somewhat 
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lowered as compared to the initial results. The initial implementation could seem to be 
the better solution than the next one only based on the results. However, given that the 
difference in the results between the PhishNet-NLP and the initial run of the modified 
algorithm are only 0.4%, it can be inferred that the PhishNet-NLP could have tested the 
phishing corpus without modifying the exceptions, or could have had the similar text 
parsing problems like the issues mentioned in the previous section 4.2.2. 
 
Table 4.4 The Comparison of TPR results 
 
 
For the FPR, the adjusted results showed the increase in the FPR compared to the 
initial results. The results are seen in the table 4.5 below. Main reason of this increase is 
that the initial implementation had an issue when it parsed sentences into words. When 
the sentences were split into the words, some words still had some punctuation marks 
such as ‘account,’. ‘("confidential")’, ‘union.’, and therefore these kinds of words could 
not be processed by the initial algorithm.  
Original Original Expanded Original Expanded
TP 68.6% 68.2% 87% 65.6% 83.5%
Total Emails 4550
No Text Emails unknown




PhishNet -NLP Modif ied algorithm
Init ial results Adjust ed result s




Table 4.5 The Comparison of FPR results 
 
 
4.2.4 Increase in both TPR and FPR 
This proposed approach obtained significantly better results in identifying 
phishing emails than the previous work. However, the rate of falsely recognizing emails 
as phishing became somewhat worse. This section explains the reasons for both increase 
in TPR and FPR based on the outcomes. First reason that contributes to improvement in 
phishing detection was that actionable keywords were found not only as verb forms, but 
also other POS forms. In the results shown in the following figures 4.10 and 4.11, the 
new expanded algorithm found 40% actionable keywords of all keywords that it founded 
from NN (noun), VBG (gerund) and VBN (past participle). The Stanford POS 
abbreviations can be found in Appendix C. The sum of those forms is larger than the 
portion of VB (verb). Even assuming that all forms of the verb were accounted for (VBN, 
VBG, etc), the sum of their tags with VB still only accounts for 70% of the data 
contributing to classification. This result shows that in many cases actionable keywords 
can exist in different POS forms, and it means that it must consider other POS when an 
actionable keyword is added. 
Original Expanded Original Expanded












Figure 4.10 Phishing Corpus POS rankings in PhishNet-NLP 
 
Figure 4.11 Phishing Corpus POS rankings in Expanding PhishNet-NLP 
 
It is likely that Stanford parser's errors contribute to the better results when all 




















































sentence is an imperative sentence. For example, in the sentence, "Click here to verify 
your account if you choose to ignore our request", the verb "Click" is tagged as NNP, and 
in the sentence, "Please visit PayPal as soon as possible to verify your identity", the verb 
visit is tagged as NN (noun). The expanded algorithm covers all POS, and that lead to 
significant improvement in phishing detection. 
 
When it comes to the higher FPR, since the new algorithm considers all POS, it 
catches and calculates more actionable keywords than the original algorithm does. That 
means the expanded algorithm could mistake legitimate emails for phishing emails. In the 
result of the expanded algorithm shown in the figure 4.12 and 4.13 below, VBG (gerund), 
NNP (singular pronoun) and NN (noun) had considerably impact on the increase in FPR. 
The portion of gerund, noun and pronoun is 44% of all actionable keywords that lead to 
the FPR. Even though those POS forms improve to detect phishing emails, at the same 
time they play a key role in increasing the FPR. 
 

























Figure 4.13 Legitimate Corpus POS rankings in Expanding PhishNet-NLP 
 
The proposed algorithm resulted in the increase in FPR. 6% increase may not be 
substantial, but incorrectly flagging an important legitimate email as phishing could have 
large costs on users. This problem should be addressed. 
 
4.3 Tuning out FPR 
The proposed algorithm resulted in the 6% higher FPR than the FPR in the 
original algorithm. To address this increased FPR problem, the suggested solution was to 
tradeoff between TPR and FPR maximizing the decrease in FPR with minimizing the 
sacrifice of the accuracy of catching phishing emails. The rationale for this approach was 
that the frequency of each actionable word found in the phishing corpus and the 
































percentage represents the number of text scores that is more than 1 by the actionable 
word. For instance, the most frequent actionable word in the legitimate corpus is the word 
subject, and its percentage is over 25%. On the other hand, the percentage of the word 
subject in the phishing corpus is only 0.9%. If some actionable words increase FPR, but 
not TPR, more promising results can be expected by excluding those actionable words. 
 
Figure 4.14 Percentage of each actionable word in the phishing corpus. 
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4.3.1 K-Fold Cross-Validation 
To find the optimum trade-off to reduce the FPR, how much each actionable word 
affects TPR and FPR was measured. At first, it was considered to run the experiment on 
all data sets without the actionable word to identify the word’s effect on the TPR and 
FPR, and the test would be repeated until all actionable words were examined. However, 
this approach encountered a risk of overfitting problem. When the size of the training 
sample is not large enough to generate a representative sample of the true target function, 
it is said that the algorithm overfits the training samples – in other words, if the algorithm 
derived from the training examples actually does not perform quite well over the 
instances except the training set, there is the overfitting problem in the algorithm 
(Mitchell, 1997). 
 
One of several techniques available to address the overfitting problem is a k-fold 
cross-validation approach. Cross-Validation is a way to statistically evaluate and compare 
learning algorithms using two data sets which consists of one training set to learn or train 
a model and one validation set to validate the model (Refaeilzadeh et al., 2009). The 
training and validation sets cross over in order for each data point to be validated. The k-
fold cross-validation is the general form of cross-validation. In k-fold cross-validation, 
the data is divided into k equal sized sets, and cross-validation of training and validation 
are performed k different times. Every time, a different partition of training and 
validation sets is used. For instance, when the first set is to be validated, the rest of k – 1 
sets are the training set for learning. Cross-validation is useful when extra data can 
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provide a validation set; however, in case that only limited data is available, the k-fold 
cross-validation approach is effective (Mitchell, 1997). 
 
This study adopted a k-fold cross-validation since the size of the data was small 
and extra data was not available. To conduct a k-fold cross-validation, the data set, the 
phishing and legitimate corpora, was partitioned into four groups. The following table 4.6 
describes the number of emails in each partition. The data was randomly divided into the 
four sets. 
Table 4.6 The number of Emails in the Partitioned sets. 
 Partition 
# Emails Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Phishing 1139 1140 1139 1140 
Legitimate 1986 1986 1986 1986 
Total 3125 3126 3125 3126 
 
4.3.1.1 Group 1 as the Validation set 
In this scenario, the first group was set as the validation set, and the rest of the 
groups were automatically set as the training set. The TPR and FPR of the training set 
were measured using all actionable words. Those rates were used to compare with the 
TPR and FPR of the training set using all except the actionable word that was tested to 
see its effect on the TPR and FPR. The increase in the TPR and FPR by each actionable 
word in the training set is seen in the figure 4.16 below. The word support, click, and use 
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had the most influence on the TPR; on the other hand, the word subject had a huge 
impact on the FPR without any effect on the TPR. 
 
Figure 4.16 Increase in TPR and FPR by each actionable word with the Group 2, 3, and 4. 
 
 To decide whether to exclude the actionable word, the statistical significance test 
was adopted. Total three different statistical significance tests were conducted to the 
actionable words. The first significance test was to determine whether the increase in the 
FPR by the actionable word was statistically significant. The null and alternative 
hypotheses are as stated below (2). 
 
H0: p1 = p2                (2) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                              
where p1 = proportion of FP using all actionable words, 
                        p2 = proportion of FP using all except the actionable word under test. 








Group 1 (Validation set)





This hypothesis was evaluated using McNemar’s Test which is a well-known 
analysis for proportions from paired data (McNemar, 1947). For the McNemar’s Test, the 
MedCalc statistical software version 12.7.5.0 was used (MedCalc, 2013). 
 
The significance test for the increase in the TPR by the actionable word was also 
conducted by using the same methods as the FPR. The null and alternative hypotheses are 
as stated below (3). 
H0: p1 = p2                (3) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                              
where p1 = proportion of TP using all actionable words, 
                        p2 = proportion of TP using all except the actionable word under test. 
(proportions in the training set) 
 
 If the results of two hypotheses testing conclude that the effect of the actionable 
word on both TPR and FPR is statistically significant, then the proportion of the increase 
in TPR and the proportion of the increase in FPR are compared by using the two 
proportions hypothesis testing. Since the data of TPR was different from the data of FPR, 
unlike the previous two tests, this test used the two proportions hypothesis testing. The 
null and alternative hypotheses are as stated below (4). 
 
H0: p1 = p2                (4) 
Ha: p1 > p2,                              
where p1 = proportion of the increase in FP by the actionable word, 
           p2 = proportion of the increase in TP by the actionable word. 
(proportions in the training set) 
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The following table 4.7 lists the results of all actionable words’ hypothesis tests. 
In the table, the label “No Change” on the third column means that the actionable word 
does not affect the TPR, and the label “Unnecessary” on the firth column means that the 
hypothesis test is not needed because either of the previous tests was not statistically 
significant. In the last column, the final decision whether to exclude the actionable word 
from the list of actionable words or not was made based on the results of the significance 
test. The significance level was set at 0.05. 
 
Table 4.7 Significance test results of the actionable words with the Group 2, 3, and 4. 
Word 
Significance Test (P-value) (significance level: α = 0.05) 
Conclusion H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2 
(p1: FPR with all words) 
(p2: FPR w/o  the word) 
H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2 
(p1: TPR with all words) 
(p2: TPR w/o  the word) 
H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 > p2 
(p1: FPR increase by the 
word) 
(p2: TPR increase by the 
word) 
support P = 0.0156 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
click P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
use P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
update P = 0.0313 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
confirm P = 0.0078 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
follow P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
visit P = 0.1250 P < 0.0001 Unnecessary Include 
submit P = 0.2500 P = 0.0156 Unnecessary Include 
see P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P = 0.6554 Include 
employ P = 1.0000 P = 0.5000 Unnecessary Include 
cancel P = 1.0000 P = 0.5000 Unnecessary Include 
challenge P = 1.0000 No Change Unnecessary Include 
snap P = 0.2500 P = 1.0000 Unnecessary Include 
apply P = 0.0625 P = 1.0000 Unnecessary Include 
Table 4.7 Continued.  
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go P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P = 0.6844 Include 
sustain P = 0.0313 No Change Unnecessary Exclude 
move P < 0.0001 P = 0.0625 P = 0.0119 Exclude 
utilize P < 0.0001 No Change Unnecessary Exclude 
subject P < 0.0001 No Change Unnecessary Exclude 
 
 It was decided to exclude four actionable words: sustain, move, utilize, and 
subject, for the effect on the FPR by each of the four words was statistically significant, 
and the effect on the TPR by the four words was either none or not statistically significant. 
Here, those actionable words increasing the FPR, but not the TPR were called bad 
keywords. The TPR and FPR with the training set were re-measured except for the four 
bad keywords, and the results were compared with the results obtained using all 
actionable words. The comparison on the results is seen in the figure 4.17. 
 
 

















Group 2 & 3 & 4 (Training set)





 The test without the bad keywords resulted in 5.3% decrease in the FPR, and 0.14% 
decrease in the TPR. The hypothesis test was conducted to the decrease in the TPR and 
the FPR to see whether the difference was statistically significant. The null and 
alternative hypotheses are as stated below (5) for the TPR, and (6) for the FPR. 
 
H0: p1 = p2                (5) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                              
where p1 = proportion of TP using all actionable words, 
                                  p2 = proportion of TP using all except the bad keywords. 
(proportions in the training set) 
 
H0: p1 = p2                (6) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                              
where p1 = proportion of FP using all actionable words,  
                                  p2 = proportion of FP using all except the bad keywords. 
(proportions in the training set) 
 
The p-value of the hypothesis test (5) was 0.0625 which could not reject the null 
hypothesis. In other words, the data did not provide enough evidence that the decrease in 
the TPR was statistically significant. The p-value of the hypothesis test (6) was less than 
0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis became rejected. The conclusion is that the data 
provided that the decrease in the FPR was statistically significant.  
 
For the next step, the TPR and FPR with the validation set were re-measured in 




Figure 4.18 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 1. 
 
The test resulted in 2.97% decrease in the FPR, and 0.09% decrease in the TPR. 
The null and alternative hypotheses are as stated below (7) for the TPR, and (8) for the 
FPR. 
H0: p1 = p2                (7) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                              
where p1 = proportion of TP using all actionable words,  
                                 p2 = proportion of TP using all except the bad keywords. 
(proportions in the validation set) 
 
H0: p1 = p2                (8) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                              
where p1 = proportion of FP using all actionable words, 
                                 p2 = proportion of FP using all except the bad keywords. 






















The p-value of the hypothesis test (7) was 1.000 which could not reject the null 
hypothesis. In other words, the data did not provide enough evidence that the decrease in 
the TPR was statistically significant. The p-value of the hypothesis test (8) was less than 
0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. Therefore, the data provided 
that the decrease in the FPR was statistically significant. 
 
 To check if the differences in the decrease in TPR and FPR between the training 
set and the validation set is statistically significant, the following hypothesis tests, (9) for 
TPR, (10) for FPR were performed. 
 
H0: p1 = p2                (9) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                              
where p1 = proportion of the decrease in TP in the training set by excluding the bad keywords, 
p2 = proportion of the decrease in TP in the validation set by excluding the bad keywords. 
 
 H0: p1 = p2                (10) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                              
where p1 = proportion of the decrease in FP in the training set by excluding the bad keywords, 
p2 = proportion of the decrease in FP in the validation set by excluding the bad keywords. 
 
The p-value of the hypothesis test (9) was 0.63836, and thereby the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected. The p-value of the hypothesis test (10) was 0, and 
thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. In other words, the data could not provide 
enough evidence that the differences in the decrease in TPR between the training set and 
the validation set was statistically significant. However, the data provided enough 
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evidence that the differences in the decrease in FPR between the training set and the 
validation set was statistically significant. 
 
4.3.1.2 Group 2 as the Validation set 
This time, the second group was set as the validation set, and the rest of the 
groups were set as the training set. The increase in the TPR and FPR by each actionable 
word in the training set is seen in the figure 4.19 below. The word support had the most 
influence on the TPR followed by the word click and use, and the word subject still had 
the most significant impact on the FPR.  
 
Figure 4.19 Increase in TPR and FPR by the actionable words with the Group 1, 3, and 4. 
 
The following table 4.8 lists the results of all actionable words’ hypothesis test. 
According to the results of the significance tests, five bad keywords were found: sustain, 








Group 2 (Validation set)





measured except for the five bad keywords, and the comparison with the results obtained 
using all actionable words was performed, which is described in the figure 4.20. 
 
Table 4.8 Significance test results of the actionable words with the Group 1, 3, and 4. 
Word 
Significance Test (P-value) (α = 0.05) 
Conclusion H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2 
(p1: FPR with all words) 
(p2: FPR w/o  the word) 
H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2 
(p1: TPR with all words) 
(p2: TPR w/o  the word) 
H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 > p2 
(p1: FPR increase by the 
word) 
(p2: TPR increase by the 
word) 
support P = 0.1250 P < 0.0001 Unnecessary Include 
use P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
click P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
update P = 0.0020 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
follow P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
confirm P = 0.0156 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
visit P = 0.0313 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
submit P = 0.5000 P = 0.0002 Unnecessary Include 
see P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P = 0.9641 Include 
employ P = 1.0000 P = 0.1250 Unnecessary Include 
go P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P = 0.6664 Include 
travel P = 1.0000 P = 0.5000 Unnecessary Include 
snap P = 0.5000 P = 1.0000 Unnecessary Include 
cancel P = 0.1250 P = 1.0000 Unnecessary Include 
challenge P = 0.2500 No Change Unnecessary Include 
sustain P = 0.0313 No Change Unnecessary Exclude 
apply P = 0.0039 No Change Unnecessary Exclude 
move P < 0.0001 P = 0.0313 P = 0.0301 Exclude 
utilize P < 0.0001 No Change Unnecessary Exclude 





Figure 4.20 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 1, 3, and 4. 
 
Excluding the bad keywords resulted in 4.76% decrease in the FPR, and 0.18% 
decrease in the TPR. For the TPR, the hypothesis test (5) was conducted, and the p-value 
was 0.0313 which rejected the null hypothesis. For the FPR, the p-value of the hypothesis 
test (6) was less than 0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. Since the 
two tests rejected the null hypothesis, the data provided enough evidence that the both 
decreases in the TPR and the FPR were statistically significant. The same process applied 
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Figure 4.21 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 2. 
 
The test produced about 5% decrease in the FPR, and only 0.08% decrease in the 
TPR. The p-value of the hypothesis test (7) was 1.000 which could not reject the null 
hypothesis. In other words, the data did not provide enough evidence that the decrease in 
the TPR was statistically significant. The p-value of the hypothesis test (8) was less than 
0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. Therefore, the data provided 
that the decrease in the FPR was statistically significant. 
 
When it comes to the significance tests for the differences in the decrease in TPR 
and FPR between the training set and the validation set, the p-value of the hypothesis test 
(9) was 0.5157, and thereby the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The p-value of the 
hypothesis test (10) was 0, and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. In other 
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TPR between the training set and the validation set was statistically significant. However, 
the data provided enough evidence that the difference in the FPR decrease between the 
training set and the validation set was statistically significant. 
 
4.3.1.3 Group 3 as the Validation set 
The third group was set as the validation set, and the group 1, 2, and 4 were set as 
the training set. The increase in the TPR and FPR by each actionable word in the training 
set is shown in the figure 4.22 below. The word support, click had the most influence on 
the TPR. When it comes to the FPR, the word subject still had the most significant impact.  
 
 
Figure 4.22 Increase in TPR and FPR by the actionable words with the Group 1, 2, and 4. 
 
The results of all actionable words’ hypothesis tests are seen in the following 
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and subject were considered as bad keywords. The TPR and FPR with the training set 
were re-measured except for the five bad keywords, and the comparison with the results 
obtained using all actionable words was performed, which is described in the figure 4.23.  
 
Table 4.9 Significance test results of the actionable words with the Group 1, 2, and 4. 
Word 
Significance Test (P-value) (α = 0.05) 
Conclusion H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2 
(p1: FPR with all words) 
(p2: FPR w/o  the word) 
H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2 
(p1: TPR with all words) 
(p2: TPR w/o  the word) 
H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 > p2 
(p1: FPR increase by the 
word) 
(p2: TPR increase by the 
word) 
support P = 0.0313 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
use P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
click P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
update P = 0.0625 P < 0.0001 Unnecessary Include 
confirm P = 0.0039 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
follow P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P = 0.9909 Include 
see P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P = 0.9826 Include 
visit P = 0.5000 P = 0.0078 Unnecessary Include 
submit P = 0.2500 P = 0.0313 Unnecessary Include 
employ P = 1.0000 P = 0.1250 Unnecessary Include 
travel P = 1.0000 P = 0.5000 Unnecessary Include 
challenge P = 0.5000 No Change Unnecessary Include 
snap P = 1.0000 P = 1.0000 Unnecessary Include 
cancel P = 0.1250 P = 0.5000 Unnecessary Include 
go P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P = 0.7224 Include 
sustain P = 0.0078 No Change Unnecessary Exclude 
apply P = 0.0005 P = 1.0000 Unnecessary Exclude 
move P < 0.0001 P = 0.0625 Unnecessary Exclude 
utilize P < 0.0001 No Change Unnecessary Exclude 





Figure 4.23 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 1, 2, and 4. 
 
The test without the five bad keywords decreased 4.51% in the FPR, and 0.18% in 
the TPR. For the decrease in the TPR, the hypothesis test (5) was conducted and the p-
value was 0.0313, and thereby the null hypothesis became rejected. For the FPR, the 
hypothesis test (6) was used and the p-value of was less than 0.0001, and thereby the null 
hypothesis became rejected. Since the two tests rejected the null hypothesis, the data 
provided enough evidence that the both decreases in the TPR and the FPR were 
statistically significant. The same process applied to the validation set and the 

















Group 1 & 2 & 4 (Training set)






Figure 4.24 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 3. 
 
The test produced 5.95% decrease in the FPR, and only 0.08% decrease in the 
TPR. For the decrease in the TPR, the p-value of the hypothesis test (7) was 1.000 which 
could not reject the null hypothesis. In other words, the data did not provide enough 
evidence that the decrease in the TPR was statistically significant. For the decrease in the 
FPR, the p-value of the hypothesis test (8) was less than 0.0001, and thereby the null 
hypothesis could be rejected. Therefore, the data provided that the decrease in the FPR 
was statistically significant. 
 
For the significance tests for the differences in the decrease in TPR and FPR 
between the training set and the validation set, the p-value of the hypothesis test (9) was 
1.000, and thereby the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The p-value of the 
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other words, the data could not provide enough evidence that the difference in the 
decrease in TPR between the training set and the validation set was statistically 
significant. However, the data provided enough evidence that the difference in the 
decrease in FPR between the training set and the validation set was statistically 
significant. 
 
4.3.1.4 Group 4 as the Validation set 
Lastly, the forth group was set as the validation set, and the group 1, 2, and 3 were 
set as the training set. The increase in the TPR and FPR by each actionable word in the 
training set is shown in the figure 4.25 below. The word click was the most outstanding 
word for the TPR, and the word subject still had the most significant impact on the FPR. 
 












Group 4 (Validation set)





The results of all actionable words’ hypothesis tests are seen in the following 
table 4.10. The significance tests found six bad keywords: apply, see, utilize, move, go, 
and subject. The TPR and FPR with the training set were re-measured except for the six 
bad keywords, and the comparison with the original result was performed. The results are 
described in the figure 4.26.  
 
Table 4.10 Significance test results of the actionable words with the Group 1, 2, and 3. 
Word 
Significance Test (P-value) (α = 0.05) 
Conclusion H0: p1 = p2 Ha: p1 ≠ p2 
(p1: FPR with all words) 
(p2: FPR w/o  the word) 
H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2 
(p1: TPR with all words) 
(p2: TPR w/o  the word) 
H0: p1 = p2 
Ha: p1 > p2 
(p1: FPR increase by the 
word) 
(p2: TPR increase by the 
word) 
use P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
click P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
support P = 0.1250 P < 0.0001 Unnecessary Include 
update P = 0.0039 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
visit P = 0.0313 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
confirm P = 0.0039 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9999 Include 
follow P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001 P > 0.9995 Include 
submit P = 1.0000 P = 0.0002 Unnecessary Include 
travel P = 1.0000 P = 0.5000 Unnecessary Include 
cancel P = 0.2500 P = 1.0000 Unnecessary Include 
snap P = 0.2500 No Change Unnecessary Include 
challenge P = 0.2500 No Change Unnecessary Include 
sustain P = 0.1250 No Change Unnecessary Include 
apply P = 0.0020 P = 1.0000 P = 0.0294 Exclude 
see P < 0.0001 P = 0.0010 P = 0.0384 Exclude 
utilize P < 0.0001 No Change Unnecessary Exclude 
move P < 0.0001 P = 0.5000 Unnecessary Exclude 
go P < 0.0001 P = 0.0001 P = 0.0002 Exclude 




Figure 4.26 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 1, 2, and 3. 
 
The test without the five bad keywords decreased 7.47% in the FPR, and 1.12% in 
the TPR. For the decrease in the TPR, the hypothesis test (5) was conducted and the p-
value was less than 0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis became rejected. For the 
decrease in the FPR, the hypothesis test (6) was conducted and the p-value of was less 
than 0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis became rejected. Since the two tests rejected 
the null hypothesis, the data provided enough evidence that the both decreases in the TPR 
and the FPR were statistically significant. The same process applied to the validation set 
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Figure 4.27 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 4. 
 
The test produced 5.62% decrease in the FPR, and 7.45% decrease in the TPR. 
For the decrease in the TPR, the p-value of the hypothesis test (7) was less than 0.0001, 
and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. For the decrease in the FPR, the 
hypothesis (8) was conducted, and the p-value of was less than 0.0001, and thereby the 
null hypothesis could be rejected. Since the two tests rejected the null hypothesis, the data 
provided enough evidence that the both decreases in the TPR and the FPR were 
statistically significant. 
 
For the significance tests for the differences in the decrease in TPR and FPR 
between the training set and the validation set, the p-value of the hypothesis test (9) was 0, 
and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. The p-value of the hypothesis test (10) 
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data provided enough evidence that the difference in the decrease in TPR between the 
training set and the validation set was statistically significant. However, the data did not 
provide enough evidence that the difference in the decrease in FPR between the training 
set and the validation set statistically significant. 
 
4.3.1.5 The Average Effects of the Iterations 
This section calculated the average effect of the four different results produced by 
the previous sections. In the table 4.11 below, the average decrease in TPR and FPR in 
the training and validation sets by removing the bad keywords is listed. The TPR of the 
validation set was much higher than the TPR of the training set. 
 
Table 4.11 The average decrease in TPR and FPR in the training and validation sets by 
excluding the bad keywords. 
Set          
The average decrease in  Training set Validation set 
TPR 0.4022 % 1.4712 % 
FPR 5.5136 %  5.3877 % 
 
In order to determine whether the decreases in the table 4.11 were statistically 
significant, the hypothesis test was conducted to the four values. The null and alternative 
hypotheses are as stated below (11). 
 H0: p1 = p2                (11) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                               
where p1 = proportion using all actionable words,  
                                             p2 = proportion except the bad keywords. 
68 
 
The p-value of the average decrease in the TPR in the training set was 0.0001, and 
the p-values of the other values were less than 0.0001. Therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. In other words, the data provided enough evidence that all decreased values 
were statistically significant. 
 
In order to see whether the difference of the decrease rate between the training set 
and the validation set was statistically significant, the following hypothesis test (12) was 
performed. 
 H0: p1 = p2                (12) 
Ha: p1 ≠ p2,                               
where p1 = proportion of the average decrease in the training set,  
                             p2 = proportion of the average decrease in the validation set. 
 
The p-value of the difference in the decrease in the TPR between the training set 
and the validation set was 0.0003, and thereby the null hypothesis was rejected. The p-
value of the difference in the decrease in the FPR between the training set and the 
validation set was 0.8756, and thereby the null hypothesis was not rejected. In other 
words, the difference in the decrease in the TPR between the training set and the 
validation set was statistically different; however, this data did not provide enough 
evidence that the difference in the decrease in the FPR between the training set and the 




4.4 Performance Improvement 
In the simulation results, it was found that the synsets reached by following the 
troponymy links from the synset of the initial actionable verbs were not quite effective in 
identifying phishing emails. As seen in the following figures 4.28 and 4.29, the 
percentages of used actionable words within the synsets of the initial actionable words 
are over 94% in both algorithms. The total numbers of used words within the synsets of 
troponym level 1 are only 5.4% in the original algorithm and 5.6% in the expanded 
algorithm. None of actionable words within the synsets of troponym level 2, 3, and 4 was 
used to detect the phishing email. 
 
 





























Figure 4.29 Percentage of the Synsets of Actionable Words in the Expanded algorithm 
with Phishing Corpus 
 
When it comes to the legitimate corpus, over 99% of the actionable words came 
from the the synset of the initial actionable words, and extremely small number of the 
actionable words within the synset of the troponym level 1 were used for testing. Just like 
the phishing corpus, any of actionable words within the synsets of troponym level 2, 3, 
and 4 was not used. The results are seen below in the figure 4.30 and 4.31. 
 



















































Figure 4.31 Percentage of the Synsets of Actionable Words in the Expanded algorithm 
with Legitimate Corpus 
 
 Considering the results, it can be needless processing time to use the synsets of 
troponym level 2, 3, and 4 for testing both phishing and legitimate corpora. In fact, the 
number of words in the synset dramatically grows as the troponym level increases, and 
processing the synsets of troponym level 2, 3, and 4 take a considerable time. The 
numbers of words in the synsets used in this study are listed in the following table. In the 
table, V refers to the initial actionable words. 
Table 4.12 Numbers of Words in Each Synset 
Synset The number of words 
Synset(V) 35 
Troponyms Lv.1 (Synset(V)) 236 
Troponyms Lv.2 (Synset(V)) 1211 
Troponyms Lv.3 (Synset(V)) 2825 


























 In the modified algorithm, the synsets of troponym level 2, 3, and 4 were 
excluded so as to increase the performance. Each processing time by the scope of the 
synsets was measured and the results are shown in the table 4.4 below. Each experiment 
was conducted with all 12502 emails that consisted of 4558 emails in the phishing corpus 
and 7944 emails in the legitimate corpus. The experiment (Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1) 
only took about 21 minutes; however, the experiment (Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1 & 2 
& 3 &4) took about 3 hours 50 minutes to examine the data sets.  
 
Table 4.13 The Processing Time by the scope of the Synsets 
The scope of the Synsets The Processing Time 
Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1 21m 3s 865ms 
Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1 & 2 54m 48s 869ms 
Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1 & 2 & 3 2h 13m 25s 767ms 




CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Summary of Research 
This thesis explored a method of text-based phishing detection by utilizing natural 
language techniques and reported on its results. The proposed algorithms improved upon 
the early work called PhishNet-NLP. In the PhishNet-NLP, the phishing detection of text 
analysis portion fell behind the other analyses portions. The study focused on the 
improvement of text analysis portion in the PhishNet-NLP. The main concept of the 
modified algorithm was to expand the scope of the actionable verbs used in the text 
analysis. The expansion resulted in the considerably better phishing detection rate than 
the rate of the original text analysis in PhishNet-NLP; however, at the same time, the 
FPR was somewhat worse since more emphasis on the importance of detecting as many 
phishing emails as possible also increases the risk of falsely identifying legitimate text as 
phishing. 
 
To ameliorate the increased FPR, the statistical approach was adopted. This idea 
came from the different actionable words’ frequency between the phishing corpus and the 
legitimate corpus. Since some actionable words called bad keywords here deteriorated the 
FPR, it was expected that excluding the actionable words causing the high FPR from the 
74 
 
list of actionable words would be able to significantly reduce the FPR. The statistical 
evaluations using the cross-validation technique concluded that eliminating the bad 
keywords decreased both the TPR and the FPR, and the decreased rates were all 
statistically significant. Although the significance test evaluated that the decreased TPR 
was statistically significant by excluding bad keywords, compared to the considerably 
reduced FPR, the TPR only had moderate damage from the trade-off. 
 
When it comes to the time performance, this study was able to shorten the 
processing time by not using unused actionable words. Specifically, this modified 
algorithm was able to perform over 10 times faster than the original algorithm by 
excluding the synsets of troponym level 2, 3, and 4 of actionable words. In the real world, 
the processing time can be crucial for the email system where hundreds of thousands of 
transactions occur. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Future Work 
This study produced fairly improved phishing detection result. Using the difference 
in the actionable words’ frequency between the phishing corpus and the legitimate corpus 
was a possible suggestion to reduce the FPR; however, the FPR still remains to be 
addressed. 
 
One possible way to decrease FPR would be to adopt the fuzzy logic approach. In 
this scheme, the standard score used to classify an email was binary that the score 0 
indicates a legitimate email, and the score more than 1 refers to phishing email. The word 
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scores that were found in the phishing corpus were as follows: 4733 scored 1.0, 8746 
scored 1.5 and 870 scored 2.0. For the legitimate corpus, the scores were as follows: 2123 
scored 1.0, 67 scored 1.5, and 9 scored 2.0. In the legitimate corpus, 1.0 word scores 
mostly increased the FPR. Using the fuzzy logic technique will allow a user to determine 
whether to delete the email which is scored 1.0 by the current system. The fuzzy logic 
system will be able to inform the user by labeling the 1.0 scored email as to be examined 
by user instead of right throwing the email into a spam box. 
 
This study placed an emphasis on finding if there are any patterns in the texts in the 
phishing emails which could be distinguishable from legitimate emails. Against the 
expectation, any distinguishable pattern in the text was not found. As the main objective 
of the future work, it is expected that adding semantic component will reduce the FPR 
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Figure A 1 The actionable words and counted words for text score 
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Appendix B The list of full stopwords 
 
Figure B 1 The list of full stopwords 
 
Jr. being hasn't it's same those who's
Sr. both have its shan't through whom
Dr. but haven't itself she to why
Prof. by having let's she'd too why's
Mr. can't he me she'll until with
Mrs. cannot he'd more she's up won't
Ms. could he'll most should very would
Miss. couldn't he's mustn't shouldn't was wouldn't
a did her my so wasn't you
about didn't hers myself some we you'd
after do herself no such we'd you'll
again does him nor than we'll you're
against doesn't himself not that's we're you've
all doing his of the we've your
am don't how off their were yours
an down how's only theirs weren't yourself
and during i or them what yourselves
any each i'd other themselveswhat's us
are few i'll ought then when
aren't for i'm our these when's
as from i've ours they where
at further if ourselves they'd where's
be had is out they'll which
because hadn't isn't over they're while
been has it own they've who
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Appendix C Standford POS name abbreviations 
 
Figure C 1 Stanford POS name abbreviations 
 
